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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Labor market reforms in Europe: 
towards more flexicure labor markets?
Werner Eichhorst1*, Paul Marx1,2 and Caroline Wehner1,3
Abstract 
Labor market segmentation refers to a salient divide between secure and insecure jobs and is related to problems 
in important areas, including macro-economic efficiency, workers’ well-being and repercussions for social cohesion. 
EU-28 countries have started a new wave of labor market reforms in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 crisis to tackle 
a number of issues, including labor market segmentation. This particularly concerns reforms in: (1) employment 
protection, i.e. dismissal protection and restrictions on fixed-term contracts; (2) unemployment benefit generosity 
and coverage; and (3) the intensity of active labor market policies. The paper provides an overview of reform patterns 
and tries to assess whether and to what extent these reforms have led to less dualized, more ‘flexicure’ labor markets 
in terms of dismissal protection, the provision of unemployment benefits and access to ALMPs. In particular, we will 
provide some evidence on potential changes in hirings on temporary contracts.
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1 Introduction
Labor market segmentation has been one of the most 
prominent topics in recent European policy debates. 
The issue has gained new momentum with the asym-
metrical impact of the 2008/2009 recession on young 
people and the subsequent wave of labor market reforms 
implemented particularly in countries hit by the crisis. 
In Europe, segmentation has mainly taken the form of a 
divide between permanent and temporary jobs and it is 
this aspect we will focus on. The goal of this paper is to 
show trends in this form of labor segmentation, provide 
an overview of recent labor market reforms and assess 
whether these reforms have deepened the segmentation 
or—reversing a long-standing trend—helped to over-
come divides in the labor market that were often attrib-
uted to institutional dysfunctionalities.
While our contribution is mainly descriptive, we none-
theless believe it is important for academic and policy 
debates. In the past years, segmentation has become a 
major impetus for deregulation. Various European coun-
tries have, for instance, lowered employment protection 
with the explicit goal to overcome segmentation. Given 
that deregulation can have social and political costs, it is 
important to accumulate evidence on the effectiveness of 
this approach. However, deregulation is not the only way 
to tackle segmentation, neither in practice nor in theory 
(Rubery and Piasna 2016). The flexicurity approach empha-
sises, for example, how social protection and human capital 
investment can compensate for lacking job security. Against 
this background, we consider a broad range of policies that 
could, in principle, tackle labour market segmentation. 
This perspective allows us to remain as open as possible 
in answering to our overarching question: which policy 
approach can contribute to overcoming segmentation?
We show that EU member states adopted various policy 
strategies to address segmentation in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. The issue clearly has a prominent place 
on policy agendas. That said, the more pessimistic mes-
sage of our analyses is that these initiatives have (so far) 
failed to produce a noticeable reduction in labour market 
segmentation—a best practice case is difficult to find.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with two 
short background sections on segmentation theory and 
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on patterns of temporary employment in the European 
Union, highlighting considerable segmentation between 
temporary and permanent jobs, even if upward transi-
tions happen frequently. In the subsequent section, we 
review recent attempts of member states to address labor 
market segmentation on four dimensions: employment 
protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefits, 
active labor market policies (ALMP) and working-time 
flexibility. We will assess the extent to which segmenta-
tion has been reduced or deepened through reforms, 
particularly regarding EPL, unemployment benefits and 
ALMPs. Subsequently, we briefly point to the challenges 
that policy-makers face in reducing labor market seg-
mentation. A final section concludes and derives policy 
recommendations.
2  Theoretical background
What do we mean when we talk about labor market seg-
mentation? The term has been used in different ways 
over recent decades (see below). In this article, we will 
use it to refer to a salient divide in European labor mar-
kets between secure and insecure jobs. This divide has 
been institutionalized by the creation and expansion of 
non-standard forms of employment, most notably tem-
porary employment (such as fixed-term and agency 
work) (Eichhorst and Marx 2012; Marx 2015). It does 
not make much sense to think of segmentation in static 
terms. A labor market is only segmented if there are sig-
nificant mobility barriers. A large stock of temporary 
workers in the labor market is unproblematic if there is 
high mobility into secure jobs; indeed, many temporary 
workers make such a successful transition. However, seg-
mentation exists if workers feel ‘trapped’ in unstable and 
insecure jobs, interrupted by repeated unemployment 
spells. Addressing segmentation thus means addressing 
(lacking) mobility into stable jobs.
It is noteworthy that segmentation and its causes 
have been theorized from rather contradictory perspec-
tives (Marx 2012). Originally, segmentation was seen as 
a consequence of employer strategies reinforcing socio-
structural divides (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Reich et al. 
1973). Since the 1990s, the dominant perspective has 
been to explain segmentation as a result of labour mar-
ket institutions. Employment protection legislation in 
particular has been identified as a mobility barrier into 
the core labor market (Bentolila et al. 2012; Rueda 2005; 
Saint-Paul 1996). The reason is that employers antici-
pate turnover costs, which incentivizes relying on a small 
core workforce complemented with a periphery of tem-
porary workers. The reverse reasoning that deregulating 
employment protection could reduce segmentation and 
‘insider–outsider divides’ is strongly reflected in con-
temporary policy advice. However, empirical evidence 
supporting this conjecture is sparse (Kahn 2010; see 
Rubery and Piasna 2016 for an overview). Our contribu-
tion to this debate is to assess to what extent countries 
have embarked on the flexibility (or flexicurity) agenda 
(again) and if this has led to a reduction of segmentation. 
This is justified in particular by the fact that the crisis 
has led to intense efforts to reform dismissal regulation. 
Because this institution that has been characterized by 
strong path dependence (Boeri 2011), past research could 
only exploit very limited over-time variation for such 
analyses.
To be more specific, we have to be clear about which 
problems resulting from segmentation are to be addressed. 
With some simplification, they can be found in two broad 
areas: macro-economic efficiency and workers’ well-being. 
Regarding macro-economic effects, there are indications 
that the growth of temporary employment has hampered 
productivity growth (because investment in the workforce 
is discouraged) and failed to increase employment levels 
(because secure employment is substituted with tempo-
rary jobs) (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007; Boeri 2011).
There is also strong evidence that job insecurity and 
temporary contracts in particular depress workers’ health 
and well-being (Benach et  al. 2014; De Cuyper et  al. 
2008). Naturally, the same is true for unemployment and 
poverty, as experiences that are inevitable if mobility out 
of insecure jobs is lacking. There are strong indications 
that the stress caused by such social problems not only 
impedes health but also interferes with central aspects of 
people’s lives, including cognitive abilities, family forma-
tion and parenting (e.g. Mani et al. 2013).
What makes segmentation and labor market risk par-
ticularly stressful is that many European welfare states 
are ill-prepared to deal with non-standard workers. 
Built upon the assumptions underlying the post-war 
employment model, eligibility criteria for social insur-
ance benefits often disadvantage workers with short and 
interrupted work records (Berton et  al. 2012; Clasen 
and Clegg 2011; Hinrichs and Jessoula 2012). As Palier 
and Thelen (2010) emphasise, political representatives 
of core workers in countries with strong segmentation 
have incentives to design social policy in an exclusion-
ary way. This would mean that employment structures 
and welfare state institutions reinforce each other in 
producing labor market disadvantage. Such ‘dualization’ 
is diametrically opposed to the notion of flexicurity, 
as it has been promoted by the European Commission 
for some time. Here, the idea is that the welfare state 
compensates for disadvantage in the labour market 
and facilitates mobility. While the political economy 
literature is sceptical regarding the prospects of mod-
ernizing social security systems along the lines of out-
sider-friendly flexicurity (Rueda 2006, 2014), there is 
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little empirical evidence on this aspect in a broad com-
parative perspective. However, the crisis has brought 
insufficient protection of temporary workers in many 
countries to the forefront and we believe it is important 
to assess reform efforts in this area.
3  Background: labor market segmentation in the 
European Union
In this article, we focus on a specific form of segmenta-
tion, namely segmentation between workers with perma-
nent and temporary employment contracts. While this is 
not to deny that other potentially precarious forms of 
non-standard employment exist- including part-time 
employment, temporary agency work, and quasi-depend-
ent self-employment—as opposed to temporary employ-
ment, part-time employment is predominantly voluntary 
in most European countries.1 Moreover, while temporary 
agency work and dependent self-employment can be 
highly precarious, they make up considerably smaller 
shares of the European workforce.
Figure  1 presents the development of the share of 
workers with temporary employment contracts in the 
EU-28 countries. Besides the share among all wage earn-
ers, it also presents shares among young (15–29  years) 
and older workers (55–54 years). First of all, there is con-
siderable variation across member states. For instance, 
low shares of around six per cent or less are observed 
in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the 
UK. Shares considerably above the EU-28 average of 14% 
can be found in Croatia, Sweden (both 17%), Cyprus 
(19), Portugal, the Netherlands (both 21), Spain (24) and 
Poland (28).
The solid black line in Fig.  1 very clearly shows that 
the young are disproportionately affected by temporary 
employment. While this is a well-known pattern, a dis-
comforting finding is that the gap between the young and 
the general population is dramatically growing in some 
countries, particularly Croatia, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, Poland, Slovenia and (in most recent years) Spain. 
Furthermore, there is a growing share of temporary 
employment among the young in Germany, although the 
development is difficult to assess against the background 
of Germany’s sizable apprenticeship system, which is 
responsible for about half of all temporary contracts.
Temporary employment in the age bracket of 55–64 
is substantially less pronounced compared to the gen-
eral workforce in virtually all member states. The highest 
shares are observed for Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal, Spain 
(all around ten per cent) and Poland (18). Moreover, the 
development in this group is rather stable. Hence, we can 
1 Only in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Slovakia was the majority of part-time 
employment involuntary in 2014. Only in Italy and Spain does it account for 
more than ten per cent of employment (OECD 2015).
conclude that the problem pressure in terms of segmen-
tation is much stronger among young workers and thus it 
seems advisable to focus on this group.
Looking at stocks of temporary workers might be 
misleading because policy changes only affect newly 
recruited workers. Figure  2 thus presents the share 
of temporary contracts among new employment con-
tracts (less than 3 months old) at two different points 
in time as presented by the OECD. At this level of 
aggregation we observe a rather strong persistence 
over the past years and in many member states tempo-
rary contracts among newly recruited workers remain 
pervasive.
A striking pattern in Figs.  1 and 2 is that not a sin-
gle member state managed to reverse the trend of grow-
ing temporary employment among the young. A partial 
exception is Spain, where many temporary jobs were 
lost, lowering their share in total employment. Further-
more, the decline came from an extremely high level and 
has been reversed in recent years, exhibiting the high-
est shares of fixed-term contracts in youth employment 
as well as recent hirings. Hence, the project of ‘address-
ing labor market segmentation’ cannot build upon easily 
identifiable best-practice cases. One important reason 
for this lack of success is arguably that many of the most 
segmented countries face a difficult overall labor market 
situation. The upper panel in Fig. 3 plots unemployment 
rates and temporary employment shares among those 
aged 15–24 (in 2014). With youth unemployment rates 
above 30% and despite regulatory issues, the Mediterra-
nean countries also suffer from a lack of labor demand 
and cannot offer young people a sufficient number of 
secure positions in the labor market. This also means 
that reducing temporary employment cannot be the top 
priority among policy-makers in these countries. There 
is little doubt that the negative socio-economic effects 
of unemployment are much more severe than those of 
being in a temporary job.
Temporary employment does not produce segmen-
tation if it is merely a transient experience that leads to 
stable labor market inclusion. However, if temporary 
workers remain in insecure positions for a long time, we 
can conclude that they are ‘trapped’ in insecure and pre-
carious jobs. This point is best illustrated by examining 
the upward mobility of temporary workers. The Euro-
pean Commission has recently presented year-to-year 
transition rates from fixed-term to permanent contracts 
(see Fig.  3). Furthermore, the OECD (2015, p. 188) has 
recently provided numbers for the long-term prob-
abilities of temporary workers obtaining a permanent 
contract.
Low transition possibilities are found in a couple of 
countries, which can thus be characterized as having 
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strongly segmented labor markets. Here, the share of 
involuntary fixed-term jobs in all temporary contracts 
is the highest (European Commission 2016). However, 
there also is a group of countries in which labor market 
context is less disadvantageous and temporary employ-
ment are nonetheless widespread among the young. 
Some of these countries—such as Austria or Germany—
are characterized by large shares of apprentices among 
fixed-term contract holders.
The lower panel in Fig.  4 plots youth unemployment 
rates and the probabilities that temporary workers 
will obtain a permanent contract over a 10-year period 
Fig. 1 Shares of temporary in total dependent employment in different age groups, 1983–2014 (Source Eurostat (2015))
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(unfortunately, data is only available for a limited number 
of European cases). The plot reveals significant variation 
in transition rates: whereas virtually all temporary work-
ers move to permanent jobs in Austria, Estonia and Ger-
many, around half of the workers in Italy and Spain are 
still in temporary jobs, even after 10 years. The plot also 
reveals that the prospects for upward mobility strongly 
correlate with general labor market performance. While 
this is unsurprising, it is important to emphasize that 
labor market segmentation in many European countries 
is closely related to the macro-economy and insufficient 
demand for labor.
Three conclusions emerge from the analysis:
(1) Segmentation—measured as the share of temporary 
employment—is a persistent feature of many, but 
not all European labor markets. To date, no mem-
ber state has substantially managed to reverse the 
trend.
(2) Segmentation is more severe in member states with 
high youth unemployment. This concerns the share 
of temporary employment as well as the prospects 
of mobility into permanent jobs.
(3) Even if many temporary workers make a successful 
transition into permanent employment, segmenta-
tion does exist. Considerable shares of temporary 
workers appear to be ‘trapped’, even in the long run.
4  Measures taken to address labor market 
segmentation and their impact
How have member states responded to labor market 
segmentation? In this section, we present measures 
taken over recent years in the fields of EPL, unemploy-
ment benefits and ALMPs. To reduce complexity, we will 
focus this review on countries with substantive shares 
of temporary workers and the most significant policy 
changes.
4.1  Employment protection legislation
It is often argued that segmentation results from insti-
tutional mobility barriers. Because dismissals are costly 
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Fig. 2 Share of temporary contracts among new employment con-
tracts (Source OECD (2014, pp. 150))
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in strictly regulated labor markets, employers make use 
of temporary contracts that allow for a ‘cheaper’ adjust-
ment of the workforce. Many policy experts have rec-
ommended deregulating EPL for regular contracts, 
although this has proven difficult for political reasons. 
Instead, many member states have deregulated the use 
of temporary contracts: a strategy that has contributed 
to segmenting the labor market (e.g. Boeri 2011; Kahn 
2010).
Thus, there are two possible strategies to address seg-
mentation through EPL reforms, which are not mutually 
exclusive:
(1) De-regulating permanent contracts; and/or
(2) Re-regulating temporary contracts.
As mentioned above, deregulating permanent con-
tracts has been difficult to implement politically. How-
ever, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, some of the 
most segmented and crisis-ridden counties in Southern 
Europe implemented substantial deregulation, includ-
ing France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain 
(OECD 2013; Gama et al. 2015).
Shown in Fig. 5, EPL reforms—as well as reforms in other 
policy areas—can be mapped using the European Commis-
sion’s LABREF database (Turrini et al. 2015) and the ILO 
inventory on labor market reforms (Gama et al. 2015).
In line with this we can observe major changes in the 
aggregate EPL index developed by the OECD and avail-
able until 2013. Here, it has to be noted that some of the 
most recent and probably most substantial reforms have 
not yet been incorporated.
4.1.1  Dismissal protection reform
Regarding employment protection in case of open-
ended contracts, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain’s 
post-crisis reforms considerably reduced notice periods 
and severance pay for (newly hired) permanent workers 
(see Fig.  6). In Italy, building upon earlier, more partial 
reforms, the recent ‘Jobs Act’ stipulated that employers 
no longer have to reinstate workers dismissed for inva-
lid economic reasons; whereby this reform was combined 
with strong employer incentives for new hirings on open-
ended contracts, including conversions from temporary 
to permanent contracts, but falling short of a single type 
of contract removing the distinction between permanent 
and temporary types of employment (Picot and Tassinari 
2015; Sestito and Viviano 2016). In Spain, dismissals were 
facilitated by extended and clarifying the reasons for sep-
aration as well as limiting severance pay through the 2010 
and 2012 reforms, while strengthening the employment 
protection of temporary workers and encouraging inter-
nal flexibility.
While the reforms in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
arguably bring substantive reduction of EPL for perma-
nent workers, reforms in France and the Netherlands 
were more subtle. In France, workers who do not accept 
collectively agreed wage and working-time adjustments 
in economic crises can now be dismissed. In the Neth-
erlands, the 2015 Work and Security Act simplified EPL 
without necessarily lowering it clarifying the cases in 
which courts or the Public Employment Agency decide 
upon the validity of dismissals. It has also introduced a 
streamlined formula for severance pay, which will consid-
erably reduce the amount in some cases, while increasing 
it in others. Hence, the Work and Security Act brings a 
clarification rather than deregulation of EPL. In the other 
European countries with high shares of temporary work-
ers (Finland, Poland and Sweden), no substantial reforms 
Fig. 4 Youth unemployment, temporary employment and transition 
probabilities (Source Youth unemployment and share temporary 
employment: Eurostat (2015); Probability permanent job after 
10 years: OECD (2015, pp. 188))
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of EPL for permanent workers have been undertaken in 
recent years.
4.1.2  Temporary employment
The second possibility to address segmentation through 
EPL reform is re-regulating temporary contracts. Indeed, 
there have also been some—albeit less far-reaching—
changes in this direction (OECD 2013, 2014). One trend 
is to make the use of temporary contracts more expen-
sive for employers, while at the same time offering mon-
etary incentives to allow for transitions into permanent 
jobs. In Slovenia, the 2013 labor market reform raised 
employers’ unemployment insurance contributions for 
temporary jobs. However, if the temporary job is con-
verted into a permanent one, employers are exempted 
from contributions for a limited time. The social partners 
in France have agreed upon a similar reform. Since May 
2013, employers pay increased unemployment insur-
ance contributions depending on the length of the con-
tract. Contributions increase by 3 percentage points if 
the contract runs for less than one month, 1.5 if one to 
3 months and 0.5 for longer contracts. Hence, the goal is 
to make employers contribute to the costs of extremely 
flexible hiring practices. Moreover, employers in France 
are exempt from contributions for a limited period if 
they hire younger or older workers on permanent con-
tracts. In Italy, since 2012 employers have had to pay a 
contribution 1.4 percentage points higher for temporary 
rather than permanent workers, although this is reim-
bursed if the job is later converted into a permanent one 
(see also the more recent subsidy for permanent hir-
ings). In Spain, from 2015 onwards, temporary workers 
receive a higher severance pay at the end of their con-
tract. The payment corresponds to the salary of 12 days 
per year of employment with the firm and is considerably 
lower than for permanent workers. Finally, in the Neth-
erlands, social protection for temporary and freelance 
workers was improved with an Act from 2013, addressing 
the boundary of dependent work and (sometime bogus) 
self-employment.
Other restrictions of temporary work were imple-
mented in the form of a lower maximum duration. In 
Slovenia, the 2013 reform limited the time for which 
an employer can use temporary contracts for a specific 
job to 2  years. In the Netherlands, the maximum dura-
tion was limited from 3 to 2 years in 2015. However, col-
lectively agreed deviations are still possible, whereby it 
remains to be seen what the reform means in practice.
Some countries have made the regulation of temporary 
work more permissive in recent years. Italy has gone fur-
thest in this direction, whereby a recent reform has abol-
ished the need to indicate a valid reason for temporary 
employment. It has also extended the maximum dura-
tion as well as the possible number of renewals. However, 
Fig. 5 Employment protection reforms in the EU (LABREF) (Source Turrini et al. (2015) and Kiss (2015))
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Fig. 6 Changes in the OECD EPL index (Source OECD Employment Protection Database, as shown in European Commission (2016), pp. 95)
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firms are not allowed to use temporary contracts for 
more than 20% of the workforce. The maximum duration 
of temporary contracts has also been increased in Greece 
and Spain.
To summarize, on the face of it, there have been some 
important changes in the field of legislation on employ-
ment protection, an institution that was considered 
highly path-dependent before the crisis. Overall, there is 
a trend in some of the most segmented countries towards 
lower dismissal costs for permanent workers in com-
bination with a moderate (and sometimes ambiguous) 
re-regulation of temporary contracts. Overall, this tends 
to narrow the regulatory gap between permanent and 
temporary contracts at least to some extent. Nonethe-
less, have these changes contributed to reducing segmen-
tation? Given that many of the reforms have only been 
implemented in the past three to 5 years—in a situation 
with limited labor demand in most of the countries—it 
might still be too early to evaluate their impact on hir-
ing practices with currently available data. However, 
revisiting Fig. 1 casts some doubt on their effectiveness, 
showing that the share of temporary contracts has even 
increased in the countries that deregulated EPL during 
the crisis. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of workers 
aged 15–29 increased by roughly seven percentage points 
in Italy and Spain, three in France and Portugal and one 
in Greece. Of course, we do not have a counterfactual 
situation, thus making it difficult to assess the exact influ-
ence of the reforms.
Figure  7 depicts the development of shares of tempo-
rary and permanent employment among new hires in 
each year using annual data from the European Labour 
Force Survey. The patterns are potentially influenced by 
both the business cycle and institutional arrangements. 
Upon first glance, Fig. 7 confirms the persistence of long-
standing patterns in individual countries. In most coun-
tries, the pattern of permanent vs. temporary hirings has 
not dramatically changed. However, rather a long-term 
declining trend in permanent hirings seems evident (e.g. 
Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg), while a cyclical com-
ponent seems to dominate in countries such as Ireland or 
Latvia.
Table 1 shows the summary statistic for an initial OLS 
regression model presented in Table  2. The dependent 
variable ‘share of temporary employment’ is already dis-
cussed in Fig.  7. Explanatory variables are GDP growth 
and the annual unemployment rate both measured in 
percent as well as the average annual wage. We further 
control for changes in the employment protection leg-
islation (EPL) for temporary and permanent employ-
ment. Table 1 shows that on average 54 percent of new 
employment contract in 1  year are temporary. How-
ever, as already shown Fig.  7, the range of temporary 
employment strongly varies among EU countries. It is 
further shown that within the period from 2005 to 2013, 
EPL slightly decreased.
The results of the OLS regression are presented in 
Table  2. In a first step, we include the macro indicators 
introduced above into the regression. Subsequently, we 
use country as well as year dummies to account for coun-
try- and year-specific fixed effects. The results show that 
in this simplistic model the annual unemployment rate is 
robustly and significantly positive related to the share of 
temporary employed people. Accordingly, the more people 
who are unemployed, the higher the share of temporary 
employment, which is a very intuitive result. Furthermore, 
an increase in EPL for temporary employment is signifi-
cantly related to a decrease in temporary employment, 
which might also be expectable. However, after controlling 
for country and year fixed effects, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant, whereby all the other variables are less robust 
or insignificant. The result suggests that a more in-depth 
analysis is needed to explain differences in the share of 
temporary and permanent employment.
Studies on single countries based upon national data 
can provide additional evidence. Using most recent 
regional data from the Italian region of Veneto to 
analyse the effect of the Jobs Act, Sestito and Viviano 
(2016) show that the 2015 reform combining reduced 
dismissal costs and regulatory uncertainty with rela-
tively generous hiring incentives regarding the employ-
ment of permanent workers has changed firm behavior 
in the expected direction, departing at least to some 
extent from hiring and firing concentrated among 
temporary employees (see also Gama et al. 2015).
4.2  Unemployment benefits
Flexicurity—or a well-managed form of labor market flex-
ibility—also means access to reasonable social benefits 
and avoiding a double disadvantage of workers with short 
employment spells who often not only lose their job but 
also lack proper access to unemployment insurance bene-
fits. The coverage of temporary workers by unemployment 
insurance schemes is an important aspect contributing to 
labor market segmentation. In many countries, the formu-
las by which benefit generosity and eligibility are calcu-
lated tend to disadvantage workers with short employment 
spells. Moreover, since benefits are often tied to former 
earnings, the wage penalty of temporary workers trans-
lates into worse unemployment protection. The problem is 
particularly severe in many Southern European countries 
that lack a universal safety net. For instance, Berton et al. 
(2012) show that non-standard employment comes with a 
significant penalty in social insurance systems in Italy.
Modernizing the welfare state towards universalism is 
a difficult task in times of severe budget constraints. A 
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recent step towards more universal benefits was under-
taken by the introduction of Assicurazione Sociale per 
l’Impiego (ASPI) in Italy in 2013. ASPI replaces the rather 
fragmented system of unemployment benefits and makes 
the system more generous. Interestingly, the reform 
also introduced Mini-ASPI, a special benefit with lower 
contribution requirements, specifically designed for 
including workers with short employment spells. While 
benefit generosity will be the same as for ASPI recipi-
ents, duration of Mini-ASPI will be lower and condi-
tional upon the actual contribution record (Berton et al. 
2015). In May 2015, the Italian government replaced ASPI 
Fig. 7 Changes in temporary and permanent employment EU-28 for period 2003–2014 (Source Eurostat LFS (2016), own calculations (weighted). 
Shares of temporary and permanent employment among new hires in each year)
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and Mini-ASPI with a new scheme (NASPI) that uses 
rather permissive eligibility criteria close to Mini-ASPI 
(13  weeks of contributions in  the 4  years before unem-
ployment). At the same time, a new unemployment bene-
fit scheme—DIS-COLL—was piloted for atypical workers 
such as project-based collaborators (‘co.co.pro’) in parallel 
with a new unemployment assistance scheme (Picot and 
Tassinari 2015). With the goal of better reflecting the situ-
ation of temporary workers and extending coverage, the 
reform represents a remarkable step and warrants careful 
evaluation once fully effective. It has the potential to serve 
as a model for countries facing similar challenges as Italy. 
Moreover, in France, in terms of access to unemployment 
benefits for workers with relatively short employment 
spells, since 2009, 4 months of employment over the last 
28  months suffice to receive unemployment insurance 
benefits for at least 4 months. Finally, in Spain, access to 
unemployment benefits was facilitated for temporary and 
younger workers as well as self-employed, albeit—similar 
to other countries—combined with stronger work incen-
tives and activation policies for the unemployed.
Figure 8 shows that massive differences in the share of 
recent unemployed people receiving unemployment ben-
efits persist, although in some countries such as Croatia, 
Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia and Spain the coverage share 
grew during and after the crisis (albeit still far from being 
comprehensive) while it dropped in the UK, Sweden and 
Hungary.
As an approximation to benefit generosity for the least 
well-protected dismissed workers, we can refer to the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits as calcu-
lated by the European Commission (2016). Aside from 
Italy, we do not observe an expansion of unemployment 
benefit generosity for the least advantaged unemployed: 
in fact, in some countries, the benefit duration has been 
cut.
To conclude, the picture regarding the development of 
protection through unemployment benefit looks some-
what ambiguous, with notable country differences in 
terms of both in levels and changes. Despite some expan-
sion, benefit systems continue to be highly segmented in 
most countries.
4.3  Active labor market policies
Another possibility to address labor market segmentation 
is expanding ALMPs and human-capital investment in 
particular. In segmented labor markets, vulnerable work-
ers have a higher risk of becoming unemployed and thus 
are more likely to enter into contact with public employ-
ment services (PES). Access to unemployment benefits 
also tends to facilitate access to ALMPs as benefit recipi-
ents remain within the reach of PES (European Commis-
sion 2015). In principle, this provides the opportunity to 
prepare vulnerable workers better for the labor market 
and improve their future employment outcomes (e.g. job 
stability or wages). Effective ALMPs and PESs can thus 
contain the consequences of higher unemployment risks 
by enabling quick and sustainable re-employment.
Evaluation studies show that skill-oriented ALMPs are 
particularly effective in this regard: they improve the 
chance of being in employment over the long run and 
hence clearly contribute to reducing segmentation (Card 
et  al. 2015), while lock-in effects into training measures 
are less of an issue in times of recession.
Hiring incentives are another important element of 
ALMPs as they can set effective incentives to employers 
to hiring job-seekers. Many countries with segmented 
Table 1 Summary Statistics. Source Eurostat LFS (2016), 
Eurostat Database (2016) and OECD.Stat (2016), own cal-
culations
Mean SD Min Max
Share of temporary 
employed
0.542 0.185 0.184 0.901
GDP-growth in % 1.33 3.22 −9.10 10.80
Unemployment rate 
in %
8.99 4.22 3.40 27.50
Average annual 
wage
36,228.2 10,377.3 16,805.0 54,077.0
Change in EPL  
for temporary 
employment
−0.002 0.130 −0.625 1.000
Change in EPL 
for permanent 
employment
−0.023 0.100 −0.635 0.190
Table 2 Regression results: share of temporary employed. 
Source Eurostat LFS (2016), Eurostat Database (2016) and 
OECD.Stat (2016), own calculations
Due to data restrictions, the analysis is limited to the following EU countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK
Significance level: +++/--- p < 0.01; +/- p < 0.1; (-) borderline significant
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GDP-growth − (−)
Unemployment rate +++ +++ +
Average annual wage −−− +++ +
Change in EPL for temporary employ-
ment
−−−
Change in EPL for permanent employ-
ment
Country dummies x x
Year dummies x
Number of observations 162 162 162
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labor markets have a tradition of subsidizing hirings on 
a temporary basis as well as conversions into permanent 
positions. This can have strong short-term effects and 
encourage continued employment.
Job search assistance and activation policies require 
effective PESs. Sanctioning practices are only effective in 
the short run, whereas they do not lead to better long-
term outcomes.
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Hence, expanding investment in training and other 
forms of potentially effective ALMPs appears to be a 
plausible strategy towards improving long-term labor 
market integration. In fact, during the crisis, the intensi-
fication of ALMP has been on the agenda in many Euro-
pean countries, although budget constraints and capacity 
issues have influenced the actual practices (see Gama 
et al. 2015). To assess which member states followed this 
route, Fig. 9 presents ALMP expenditure per person look-
ing for work in 2007 and 2014, the most recent available 
data point for most countries. Expenditure is expressed 
in purchasing power standards, whereby small and large 
economies are comparable. The figure reveals that there 
is no general trend towards increased spending. Among 
the more segmented countries, the trend rather seems to 
proceed towards less spending per unemployed person. In 
some of the most segmented countries, this decline comes 
from a rather low pre-crisis baseline, namely in Greece, 
Italy, Poland and Spain. Furthermore, in Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Portugal the numbers point to a marked 
reduction in expenditure. Among the countries with 
moderate-to-high shares of temporary workers, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden have increased training expenditure. 
In sum, we cannot identify a clear trend towards more 
investment into ALMPs. Similar trends can also be identi-
fied when looking into participation data.
PESs have also grown in importance, albeit falling 
short of providing sufficient individualized support 
in  situations of high caseloads typically observed in 
countries with steeply increasing unemployment rates. 
Many countries have also reformed their PES structures 
over recent years, e.g. France and the UK. Regarding 
expenditure per unemployed, spending only increased 
in Germany (with a declining number of unemployed in 
the denominator), Denmark, Sweden and Estonia. It was 
neither increased nor stabilized in those countries with 
high unemployment and segmented labor markets such 
as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In particular, mobil-
ity-enhancing measures such as training, hiring incen-
tives and intensive job counselling can help to reduce 
the risk of exclusion from employment. However, there 
are important limitations to the contribution of ALMPs 
towards tackling segmentation.
First, ALMP participation is always selectively allo-
cated by the PES, whereby not all participants among the 
labor force will benefit to the same extent, while effective 
ALMPs—often allocated to the ‘best risk’ unemployed—
may simply privilege some job-seekers over others, effec-
tively creating an additional element of segmentation. 
This is particularly relevant in  situations with high and 
increasing caseloads of job-seekers.
Second, training the unemployed is most useful for 
persons with rather low or deteriorated skills, such as 
in the case of the long-term unemployed. It is more 
doubtful how effective it is for young people with recent 
educational experiences and those who have frequent 
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employment spells in the form of temporary employ-
ment. European data shows that workers with low-
skills—the prime beneficiaries of training—reflect 
the minority of all temporary workers in all countries 
(despite accounting for considerable shares in some seg-
mented labor markets, most notably Portugal and Spain). 
Quite to the contrary, in some countries a sizable share of 
the temporary workers is highly skilled, as Fig. 10 shows. 
Usually between one-quarter and one-third of all tem-
porary workers have tertiary education and this group is 
unlikely to benefit from ALMP intervention in the form 
of additional training.
Third, temporary, targeted hiring incentives may only 
provide limited relief as it may also result in churning, 
aggravating the problem of excessive turnover among 
labor market entrants or those with longer sequences of 
temporary jobs, particularly when the macro-economy is 
in a critical status and employment protection for perma-
nent workers is rigid.
National policy-makers should thus carefully evalu-
ate the mobility patterns of people with different skill 
backgrounds to decide which groups should actually 
be targeted by training and hiring incentives (which are 
rather costly policy interventions). In sum, ALMPs can 
make a considerable contribution to improving long-
term labor market integration, although, they are not a 
general remedy for segmentation particularly in coun-
tries where there are insufficient jobs for skilled work-
ers under given economic and institutional conditions. 
Therefore, in a situation of recession and austerity, ALMP 
may not be particularly effective in shortening average 
unemployment.
5  Conclusions and points for discussion
The positive message of our contribution is that, in the 
aftermath of the 2008/2009 crisis and rising youth unem-
ployment, EU member states have started to take the 
issue of segmentation more seriously. There are plenty 
of policy initiatives with the goal of overcoming labor 
market divides, although the more pessimistic message 
is that they have achieved little success to date: tempo-
rary employment keeps rising and youth unemployment 
remains worryingly high. Admittedly, it is probably too 
early to evaluate some of the very recent reforms, also 
given the difficult macro-economic environment. None-
theless, one should also consider the possibility that the 
steps taken so far are insufficient to substantially improve 
the labor market situation.
Accordingly, which policy options exist and how suit-
able are they against the background of the identified 
challenges?
While banning or prohibitively regulating tempo-
rary contracts might appear as a solution, there is clear 
evidence that temporary employment can serve as a 
bridge to permanent jobs. Eliminating this option would 
also create strong incentives to use potentially more ‘pre-
carious’ types of work such as economically dependent 
self-employment or temporary agency work. Indeed, 
there is little doubt that negative repercussions of tempo-
rary employment are dwarfed by the devastating socio-
psychological as well as political effects of long-term 
unemployment. To the extent that temporary contracts 
serve as entry points into the labor market for young 
workers or long-term unemployed, banning them prob-
ably does more harm than good.
Another frequently proposed policy solution is the 
deregulation of permanent contracts. This solution defin-
itively has some value since it would remove the labor 
market rigidity that leads to a visibly unfair distribution 
of job security and market risks and limits transition pos-
sibilities to permanent jobs. Under such a regime, per-
manent contracts would be less permanent, although 
the reliance on temporary contracts would also decline. 
Hence, a vulnerable worker would not be less vulnerable 
if his or her temporary contract is replaced with a flexible 
‘permanent’ employment contract, although the chance 
of being hired (and eventually dismissed) on a perma-
nent contract would be higher. However, if deregulation 
does not go far enough, incentives to hire on temporary 
contracts remain. Member states will thus have to try 
to find a moderate level of EPL that balances both goals, 
whereby recent EPL reforms can be interpreted as steps 
in this direction. Similar reservations can be formulated 
for the frequently proposed ‘single-employment contract’. 
Here, the idea is to replace temporary and permanent 
contracts with a unified legal framework in which dis-
missal protection is phased-in with tenure. However, the 
problem is that such a framework produces thresholds 
in dismissal costs below that employers’ prefer to replace 
a worker with a new one whose protection starts from 
zero. This effectively means that newly recruited work-
ers still face the same insecurity, at least for some time. In 
addition, if thresholds are implicit and employer-specific, 
workers do not even know how long they can stay with 
the firm and when they make a transition into secure 
employment. Depending on how the single-employment 
contract is modelled, it is quite possible that it makes the 
situation of workers with short tenure even more pre-
carious than it would be on a temporary contract. Finally, 
in the real-world situation, it is difficult to imagine an 
arrangement without any option to have temporary con-
tracts under certain conditions, meaning that some dual-
ity will remain.
A factor that can mitigate effects of temporary con-
tracts is the prospect of making a successful transition 
into stable employment. On the other hand, temporary 
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contracts are a real social and political problem if work-
ers see themselves in a ‘dead end’. For policy-makers, this 
means that ALMPs (and training in general) should be at 
the core of any strategy to improve the situation of low-
skilled temporary workers who frequently experience 
unemployment. At least in countries with relatively well-
functioning labor markets, governments should make 
every effort to ensure that lacking or obsolete skills do 
not ‘trap’ workers in chains of unemployment and precar-
ious jobs. However, such efforts are somewhat less prom-
ising in countries where there are insufficient jobs, even 
for university graduates. The use of subsidies to encour-
age conversions of temporary into permanent contracts 
is a plausible and quite widely used alternative, although 
it needs careful monitoring and evaluation. However, 
we can expect that mobility-enhancing investments in 
human capital are most promising if employment protec-
tion is reformed in a way whereby mobility is encouraged 
and transitions to long-term employment are facilitated.
Another important concern for policy-makers should 
be avoiding multiple disadvantages through the welfare 
state. The modernization of unemployment and pen-
sion systems towards more universal schemes would 
not only improve the socio-economic situation of tem-
porary workers but also increase the legitimacy of the 
dual employment model. If society compensates tempo-
rary workers for their higher risk by offering decent and 
accessible social security, this could lessen feelings of 
political marginalization or exclusion. As the fiscal situa-
tion in most affected member states does not leave much 
leeway for social policy expansion, the politics neces-
sary for such changes are complex and probably involve 
zero-sum conflicts. However, the recent Italian reforms 
towards more universal unemployment benefits demon-
strate that these are not insurmountable hurdles.
However, an important objection to ‘fixing’ the tem-
porary employment issue with social benefits and labor 
market policies is that turnover costs are shifted from 
employers to society. Another way of compensating 
temporary workers for their risk is granting them ‘inse-
curity bonuses’, as achieved in France in the form of the 
prime de précarité. In this system, employers have to pay 
a bonus to the worker (amounting to ten per cent of the 
total gross wage paid under the contract) if the employ-
ment relationship is not continued after the contract has 
expired. As mentioned, since 2013 there has also been a 
higher employer contribution rate to the unemployment 
insurance fund in case of short fixed-term contracts. This 
system ensures that employers contribute to the social 
costs of their hiring practices and increases incentives to 
use temporary contracts responsibly. In addition, it might 
reduce the perception among temporary workers being 
disadvantaged in several dimensions (unemployment 
risk and lower wages). For such a system to be effec-
tive, it would be important that, first, the bonus is suffi-
ciently high to substantively affect employers’ incentives 
and workers’ material situation (albeit without totally 
discouraging hiring). Second, it has to be ensured that 
there are no legal loopholes that allow circumventing the 
bonus. Third,—and a more general point—the equal-pay 
principle has to be vigorously enforced through moni-
toring by unions and labor inspectors as well as through 
severe sanctions in case of non-compliance; otherwise, 
employers can cancel out the insecurity bonus by low-
ering temporary workers’ wages, a practice that already 
seems to be widespread.
An alternative way to provide temporary workers with 
employer-financed social security is the Austrian Mitar-
beitervorsorgekassen. In 2003, severance payments were 
replaced with a system in which employers contribute 
on a monthly basis to an account for each worker. When 
the employment relationship is terminated, workers can 
withdraw the money from their account (instead of a sev-
erance payment) or carry it over to their next job and use 
it as pension savings. An advantage of this model is that 
also self-employed can be integrated, which is the case in 
Austria since 2008. Besides providing additional financial 
security to insecure workers, the system also overcomes 
stark differences in separation costs. However, one has to 
note that there is no incentive to employers to refrain from 
dismissals.
There is no magical formula to address labor market 
segmentation, with fiscal, economic and political cir-
cumstances significantly limiting room for maneuvre. 
Member states should nonetheless continue to care-
fully modernize labor law and welfare states, even if it 
is only possible in an incremental way. Radical deregula-
tion of permanent contracts or re-regulating of tempo-
rary contracts should be avoided. Policy-makers should 
also resist the temptation to cut ALMPs and training 
programs in particular. Given its favorable long-term 
consequences, training programs targeted at the most 
needy should be an important pillar in any strategy to 
address segmentation. Member states should continue 
to experiment with fiscal incentives to convert tempo-
rary into permanent contracts, while carefully evaluating 
the schemes and making their survival conditional upon 
success. Finally, it will be important to move towards a 
better social protection of temporary workers. For eco-
nomic and symbolic reasons, employers will have to 
make a relevant contribution to this. Austria, France and 
Italy exemplify different approaches that could be devel-
oped into more broadly applicable strategies to address 
segmentation.
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Still, there are considerable challenges regard-
ing the politico-economic feasibility of such reforms. 
First, political preferences matter. If segmentation is 
addressed though reducing the social rights of ‘insid-
ers’, it can be difficult to organize democratic majori-
ties for such proposals. EPL is a case in point, whereby 
it is unsurprising that deregulation only took place 
under severe reform pressure. Moreover, expanding 
social protection for vulnerable workers could be met 
with resistance from the majority with a low unemploy-
ment risk (the net payers) owing to the considerable 
costs of such reforms. However, it also should be noted 
that the political economy literature greatly exaggerates 
the extent to which public opinion is divided between 
insiders and outsiders. There is considerable solidar-
ity across the insider–outsider divide (Marx 2015), to 
which policy-makers can appeal, in particular in hard 
times. Second, the macro economy and budget con-
straints play a crucial role. In some countries there 
simply seems to be insufficient labor demand to offer 
secure jobs to the entire workforce. In a context of high 
unemployment and economic uncertainty, it is under-
standable if workers and policy-makers view temporary 
employment as the lesser of two evils. The situation 
is exacerbated by the fact that that (political and eco-
nomic) room for stimulating the economy is very lim-
ited in the context of the European debt crisis. Apart 
from EPL and industrial relation reforms, substantially 
improving the situation of the unemployed and tempo-
rary workers costs money: in the form of training for 
those with insufficient skills, wage subsidies, decent 
jobs in the public sector and adequate social protec-
tion (against unemployment and in old age). Needless 
to say, funding such reforms is particularly challenging 
in times of austerity. Policy-makers will have to look for 
ways to make employers contribute to the social costs 
of their hiring practices, without making temporary 
contracts so expensive that hiring is discouraged. This 
could also be an issue for EU level policies.
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